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Abstract
The paper discusses the problem of model checking a number of noninterference properties in ﬁnite state
systems: Noninterference, Nondeducibility on Inputs, Generalised Noninterference, Forward Correctability
and Restrictiveness. The complexity of these problems is characterized, and a number of possible heuristics
for optimization of the model checking are discussed.
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1 Introduction
The notion of ‘noninterference’ is a general term applied in the security literature to
a number of causality-like notions intended to capture the intuition that informa-
tion does not ﬂow from high level users to lower level users, so that conﬁdentiality
of high level information is maintained. The main approach to veriﬁcation that
systems satisfy these properties has been proof theoretic methods using so-called
‘unwinding conditions’. In this paper, we investigate the applicability of algorithmic
veriﬁcation techniques when the systems in question are ﬁnite state. We develop
algorithms for model checking a number of diﬀerent noninterference notions, and
characterize the computational complexity of the associated veriﬁcation problems.
In particular, we deal with Noninterference on deterministic systems [12,25], Nond-
educibility on Inputs [26], Generalised Noninterference [18], Forward Correctability
[15] and Restrictiveness [18].
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Noninterference has been studied under several distinct semantic models, includ-
ing state based models [12,25], trace-set models [20,30] and process algebras [23,8].
Only for the latter has there been a systematic study of algorithmic veriﬁcation of
these notions [8,9]. The process algebraic models are the most expressive, and def-
initions of noninterference notions on other models can be reduced to deﬁnitions of
noninterference notions on a process algebraic model by means of natural mappings
between the models [28]. However, state based system modelling approaches are
more natural to many, are likely to be adequate for many applications, have a more
extensive literature on algorithmic veriﬁcation, and have a more highly developed
set of veriﬁcation tools. This modelling approach also remains the predominant ap-
proach in operating systems veriﬁcation eﬀorts [14], the area originally motivating
the noninterference literature. It therefore makes sense to consider the algorithmic
veriﬁcation problem also on state based models. This is particularly so with respect
to complexity bounds, where lower bounds proved for a more expressive semantic
model may not apply on a more restrictive model. We therefore focus in this pa-
per on a state based modelling of systems, and (to make the veriﬁcation problem
decidable) restrict attention to ﬁnite state systems.
The contributions of the paper are as follows. First, we show that noninterference
in deterministic systems can be reduced to a safety property, so it is expressible in
both branching time and linear time temporal logics and veriﬁable in polynomial
time by existing model checkers. Also in PTIME is the notion of Restrictiveness on
nondeterministic systems. We show that the remaining notions of noninterference
on nondeterministic systems that we consider are PSPACE-complete. For some
of these notions (Restrictiveness and Nondeducibility on Inputs), these results are
closely related to results of Focardi and Gorrieri [8,9] (but on a more restricted
semantic model, hence not immediate consequences for the lower bounds). The
results on Generalised Noninterference and Forward Correctability are new, as far
as we know. Finally, we discuss heuristics that may be applied to the veriﬁcation
of noninterference notions, and give complexity arguments that suggest that these
heuristics may sometimes lead to optimizations.
2 State-Observed Model
The state based system models in the literature on noninterference can be roughly
classiﬁed into two distinct types, depending on whether observations are associated
with states [21,3,24] or actions [12,25]. The system deﬁnitions are similar to those
of ﬁnite state automata, with the distinction between the two types resembling the
Mealy/Moore distinction. It can be shown [28] that there exist natural mappings
between these two types of models that preserve all the security notions that we
consider in this paper. Consequently, we consider only the state-observed modeling.
The systems are input-enabled, in the sense that any action can be taken at any
time. Most of the literature restricts attention to two agents High (H) and Low (L)
and the security policy L ≤ H. This policy permits information to ﬂow from Low
to High but not from High to Low. We also make this restriction here, and take
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the set of agents (also called domains) to be D = {L,H}.
A nondeterministic state-observed state machine is a tuple of the form M =
〈S, s0,next, obs, dom,A〉 where S is a set of states; s0 ∈ S is the initial state;
A is a set of actions; the function next : S × A → P(S) \ {∅} is a transition
function, such that next(s, a) deﬁnes the set of states to which it is possible to
make a transition when action a ∈ A is performed at a state s ∈ S; the function
dom : A → D associates a security domain with each action, and the function
obs : S × D → O describes the observation made in each state by each security
domain. For readability, we ‘curry’ the function obs by obsu of type S → O if
u ∈ D. Such a state-machine is deterministic if next(s, a) is a singleton for all
states s and actions a. In this case we may deﬁne a function step : S × A → S by
next(s, a) = {step(s, a)}. We write Mns for the set of all nondeterministic state-
observed machines, and Ms for the set of all deterministic state-observed machines.
A run of a state-observed system is a sequence r = s0a1s1a2s2 . . . ansn ∈ S(AS)
∗
such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, si ∈ next(si−1, ai). Deﬁne r(i) = si to be the i-
th state on the run r and ra(j) = aj to be the j-th action. We use two types
of concatenation operation on sequences. We write α · β for the usual notion of
concatenation. A run can also be described as a fusion of two sequences: we write
r = r1 ◦ r2 if there exists m with 1 ≤ m ≤ n such that r1 = s0a1s1a2s2 . . . amsm and
r2 = smam+1sm+1am+2sm+2 . . . ansn. With respect to the simple policy L ≤ H, we
deﬁne AH = {a ∈ A | dom(a) = H} and AL = {a ∈ A | dom(a) = L}.
3 State Based Security Deﬁnitions
In this section we recall from the literature a number of classical security deﬁni-
tions. Some of them are state based and some were originally deﬁned as a trace-set
property, in which case we give a corresponding deﬁnition in our system model.
Several of the deﬁnitions are cast in terms of a notion of view capturing the
information at an agent’s disposal in a run. We take the view to be the maximal
information that an agent can have in a nondeterministic asynchronous system: its
sequence of actions and observations reduced modulo stuttering. Let Cond : X∗ →
X∗ be the function which condenses a sequence of elements into a possibly shorter
sequence by removing stuttering, such that for all a, b ∈ X, α ∈ X∗, Cond() = ,
Cond(a) = a,
and Cond(α · a · b) =
⎧⎨
⎩
Cond(α · a) · b if a 	= b,
Cond(α · a) otherwise.
Deﬁnition 3.1 For u ∈ D, deﬁne the observation function Obsu : S(AS)
∗ →
O+(AO+)∗ on a run by Obsu(s) = obsu(s), and
Obsu(δ · a · s) =
⎧⎨
⎩
Obsu(δ) · a · obsu(s) if dom(a) = u
Obsu(δ) · obsu(s) otherwise.
Deﬁne the function viewu : S(AS)
∗ → O+(AO+)∗ by viewu(r) = Cond(Obsu(r)).
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Note that an agent may make the same observation several times in a row,
without an intervening action by that agent. This indicates that another agent has
acted. To eliminate this timing-based reasoning, in order to make the deﬁnition
compatible with the assumption of asynchrony, we apply the function Cond in this
deﬁnition.
3.1 Noninterference
Historically, one of the ﬁrst information ﬂow properties was (transitive) noninter-
ference [12,13], deﬁned with respect to deterministic machines. We base our dis-
cussion on the presentation of Rushby [25], which has been followed in many other
works. As noted above, in state-observed deterministic systems, we have a function
step : S×A → S to represent the deterministic state evolution as a result of actions.
To represent the result of executing a sequence of actions, deﬁne the operation • :
S ×A∗ → S, by s •  = s; and s • (α · a) = step(s • α, a).
With respect to the simple policy L ≤ H, the deﬁnition of Noninterference can
be described in terms of the operation purgeL : A
∗ → A∗L on sequences of actions
that restricts the sequence to the subsequence of actions of L. Intuitively, the purged
H actions are not allowed to lead to any eﬀects observable to L. This is formalised
as follows in the deﬁnition of Noninterference.
Deﬁnition 3.2 A (deterministic) system in Ms satisﬁes Noninterference if for all
α ∈ A∗, we have obsL(q0 • α) = obsL(q0 • purgeL(α)). We write NIs for the set of
such systems.
3.2 Nondeducibility on Inputs
One way of understanding the statement that H does not interfere with L in a
deterministic system is as stating that every sequence of H actions is compatible
with the actions and observations of L. This leads to the proposal to take a similar
notion as the formulation of noninterference in nondeterministic systems: an ap-
proach known as Nondeducibility [26]. Nondeducibility is deﬁned in a quite general
way, in terms of a pair of views of runs. We focus here on a commonly used special
case: L’s nondeducibility of H’s actions.
To state the deﬁnition of nondeducibility, we also require a function to extract
the sequence of actions performed by an agent. We write Actu(r) for the sequence
of actions performed by agent u in run r, and Act(r) the whole action sequence
from all the agents in r.
Deﬁnition 3.3 1 A system M satisﬁes Nondeducibility on Inputs if for every α ∈
A∗H , and every observation sequence β such that there exists a run r of M with
viewL(r) = β, there exists a run r
′ of M with ActH(r
′) = α and viewL(r
′) = β.
Write NDIs for the set of systems in Mns satisfying Nondeducibility on Inputs.
1 In [28] it has been shown that Nondeducibility on Inputs is equivalent to Nondeducibility on Strategies
in purely asynchronous systems, though this is not true on synchronous machines due to [29].
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3.3 Generalised Noninterference
Generalised Noninterference (GN) was proposed in [18] to generalise Noninterference
to nondeterministic systems. The original deﬁnition of GN is a trace set property
with the intuition that the changes on high-level input must not alter the possible
future sequences of low-level events (by modifying H outputs somewhere). Here we
formulate it on our state based systems as:
Deﬁnition 3.4 A system M satisﬁes Generalised Noninterference (GN) if
(i) for all runs r of M with Act(r) = α ·α′, and for all a ∈ AH , there exists another
run r′ such that Act(r′) = α · a · α′ and viewL(r) = viewL(r
′)
(ii) for all runs r of M with Act(r) = α · a · α′ with a ∈ AH , there exists another
run r′ such that Act(r′) = α · α′ and viewL(r) = viewL(r
′).
Write GNs for the set of systems in Mns satisfying Generalised Noninterference.
Note that this deﬁnition implies that every possible L observation is consistent
with every sequence of H Actions, so GNs is at least as strong as NDIs. However,
GNs is seemingly a stronger notion than NDIs in that the latter allows L to rule out
certain possible H/L action interleavings whereas GNs requires that all interleavings
are consistent.
3.4 Forward Correctability
Forward Correctability (FC) was ﬁrst introduced in [15]. Similar to Generalised
Noninterference, FC was deﬁned as a property on sets of traces. We formulate it
as follows in state-observed systems. Deﬁne the relation ≡ on runs by r1 ≡ r2
if r1 and r2 have the same length n ∈ N, r
a
1(j) = r
a
2(j) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and
obsu(r1(i)) = obsu(r2(i)) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n and u ∈ D.
Deﬁnition 3.5 A system M satisﬁes Forward Correctability (FC) if
(i) for all runs r = r1 ◦ r2 of M such that Act(r1) = α and Act(r2) = α
′ with α′ ∈
A∗L, for all a ∈ AH , there exists a run r
′ = r′1 ◦ r
′
2 with r1 ≡ r
′
1, Act(r
′
2) = a ·α
′
and viewL(r) = viewL(r
′)
(ii) for all runs r = r1 ◦ r2 of M such that Act(r1) = α and Act(r2) = a · α
′ with
a ∈ AH and α
′ ∈ A∗L, there exists a run r
′ = r′1 ◦ r
′
2 with r1 ≡ r
′
1, Act(r
′
2) = α
′
and viewL(r) = viewL(r
′).
Write FCs for the set of systems in Mns satisfying Forward Correctability.
FCs is seemingly stronger than GNs because any ‘perturbation’ must be cor-
rectable in the future for FCs but GNs allows it to be correctable either in the past
or in the future.
3.5 Restrictiveness
There are two versions of ‘Restrictiveness’ introduced in McCullough’s early works.
The former [17] is a trace based deﬁnition, while the latter is essentially deﬁned on
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labelled transition systems [18,19]. In [19] McCullough mentions both deﬁnitions
and concludes that the one on labelled transition systems is stronger. Here we follow
the latter deﬁnition. This is close to the notion of unwinding relation which is a way
of facilitating proofs of traditional noninterference on deterministic systems [25].
Deﬁnition 3.6 An unwinding relation for a system M ∈ Ms is an equivalence
relation ∼L on the states of M satisfying the following conditions, for all states s, t
and actions a: 2
• Output Consistency : if s ∼L t then obsL(s) = obsL(t);
• Locally Respects: if a ∈ AH then s ∼L step(s, a);
• Step Consistency : if a ∈ AL and s ∼L t then step(s, a) ∼L step(t, a).
The relationship between unwinding conditions and noninterference is given by
the following classical results:
Theorem 3.7 [13,25]
(i) If there exists an unwinding relation for M ∈Ms, then M ∈ NIs.
(ii) If M ∈ NIs then there exists an unwinding relation for M .
The following is a natural generalization of Deﬁnition 3.6 to nondeterministic
systems.
Deﬁnition 3.8 An unwinding relation for a system M ∈ Mns is an equivalence
relation satisfying
• OC: if s ∼L t then obsL(s) = obsL(t).
• LR: if a ∈ AH and t ∈ next(s, a) then s ∼L t,
• SC: if a ∈ AL and s ∼L s
′ and t ∈ next(s, a), then there exists t′ ∈ next(s′, a)
such that t ∼L t
′.
McCullough’s [19] Restrictiveness deﬁnition is similar in spirit to unwinding but
distinguishes between inputs and outputs on actions. Since on state-observed sys-
tems, outputs are ‘embedded’ in states, the above is a somewhat simpliﬁed version
of what was introduced by McCullough, and we have the following deﬁnition of
Restrictiveness on state-observed systems.
Deﬁnition 3.9 M ∈ Mns satisﬁes Restrictiveness, written M ∈ RESs, if there
exists an unwinding relation for M .
The property RESs is inherently stronger than the other security notions we
have introduced here, since intuitively every ‘perturbation’ from H always leads
L to a state which is observationally bisimilar to its original state. The following
summarizes the known relations between the deﬁnitions we have introduced above.
2 We present a slight modiﬁcation of the usual deﬁnition, which would have an equivalence relation ∼u for
each agent u, satisfying a similar set of conditions for each u. For the policy L ≤ H we can take ∼H to be
the universal relation, which automatically satisﬁes the necessary conditions.
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Proposition 3.10 The following containments are strict: RESs ⊂ FCs ⊂ GNs ⊂
NDIs. On deterministic systems, the notions NIs, NDIs, GNs, FCs and RESs
are equivalent.
4 Verifying Noninterference Properties
We now turn to the main interest of this paper: veriﬁcation methods and complexity
results for the security properties introduced in the previous section. None of these
properties is directly expressible in the traditional safety-liveness framework [1], as
they express not a constraint on single system execution, but rather a constraint on
the set of all possible executions. We therefore need to develop new techniques for
their veriﬁcation.
4.1 Unwinding Characterizable Properties
In this section we consider the property NIs and its generalization RESs, both of
which can be characterized by an unwinding relation.
The following is a way to decide noninterference NIs on deterministic state-
observed systems by a doubling construction. Given a deterministic system M =
〈S, s0, step, obs, dom,A〉, deﬁne M
2 = 〈S2, s20, step
2, obs2, dom,A〉 to be the system
with identical actions and domains, with states S2 = S×S, initial state s20 = (s0, s0),
observation function obs2 : D×S2 → (O×O) given by obs2u(s, t) = (obsu(s), obsu(t))
for s, t ∈ S, and transition function step2 : S2×A → S2 given by step2((s1, s2), a) =
(step(s1, a), step(s2, a)) for a ∈ AL and step
2((s1, s2), a) = (step(s1, a), s2) for a ∈
AH .
Note that in every transition, a ∈ AH is applied only on the left part of each
state pair. An easy induction shows that for every sequence of actions α ∈ A∗, if
s20 • α = (s, t) in M
2, then in M we have s = s0 • α and t = s0 • purgeL(α). We
therefore obtain the following:
Proposition 4.1 For M ∈ Ms, we have M ∈ NIs iﬀ in M
2, for all states (s, t)
reachable from s20, we have that obs
2
L((s, t)) = (o, o
′) implies o = o′.
Now NIs is reduced to a safety property, which says M
2 will never reach a pair of
states (s, t) on which L has a pair of diﬀerent views. This enables noninterference to
be checked using standard model checking technology, for both linear and branching
time.
Corollary 4.2 For M ∈Ms, checking M ∈ NIs can be done in time O(|S|
2× |A|)
and additional space O(|S|2).
Proof. The system M2 has at most |S|2 states. Performing a search algorithm
to traverse every possibly reachable state by trying every possible action takes
|S|2 × |A|. Marking states reached requires space |S|2, in addition to the space
needed to represent M . 
Barthe et al. [2] and Davas et al. [6] proposed a self-composition technique to
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reason about language based noninterference properties, which is somewhat similar
to our method for NIs. However, their deﬁnitions of noninterference are targeted at
reasoning about programming languages and assume that a single input is given at
the beginning and a single output observed at the end of the computation, whereas
we deal with systems permitting an arbitrary sequence of actions to be performed
by two distinct agents, and generating outputs throughout the computation.
The property RESs can be regarded as a nondeterministic version of NIs be-
cause they both are characterizable by the existence of an unwinding relation.
This property can be characterized using ﬁxpoints as follows. Deﬁne the opera-
tor TL : P(S × S) → P(S × S) by (p, q) ∈ TL(X) iﬀ
• (p, q) ∈ X and obsL(p) = obsL(q)
• for all p′ ∈ next(p, a) and a ∈ AL there exists q
′ ∈ next(q, a) such that (p′, q′) ∈ X
• for all q′ ∈ next(q, a) and a ∈ AL there exists p
′ ∈ next(p, a) such that (p′, q′) ∈
X.
The operator TL is monotonic, in the sense that ∼1⊆∼2 implies TL(∼1) ⊆
TL(∼2). The set of binary relations on S and the subset relation (⊆) have the
structure of a complete lattice. The Knaster-Tarski theorem [27] asserts the exis-
tence of least and greatest ﬁxpoints of a monotonic operator on a complete lattice.
We write νX.TL(X) for the greatest binary relation ∼ satisfying ∼⊆ TL(∼). The
following result characterizes RESs in terms of TL and the property LR (in Deﬁni-
tion 3.8).
Proposition 4.3
(i) M ∈ Mns satisﬁes RESs iﬀ there exists an equivalence relation ∼⊆ S × S
satisfying ∼= TL(∼) and LR.
(ii) M ∈Mns satisﬁes RESs iﬀ νX.TL(X) satisﬁes LR.
The understanding of the property RESs in Proposition 4.3(ii) yields several
algorithmic approaches to its veriﬁcation. One approach is symbolic, using Binary
Decision Diagrams [5] to relations. The operation TL is readily encoded as an
operation on BDDs, and the computation of νX.TL(X) and the veriﬁcation that it
satisﬁes LR can be implemented using standard operations on BDDs.
We also obtain a bisimulation-based approach. From Deﬁnition 3.8, an unwind-
ing relation is essentially a strong bisimulation relation with respect to AL, and
Proposition 4.3 requires the largest ∼. It is known that computing the largest
bisimulation on a labelled transition system can be reduced to the problem of ﬁnd-
ing the coarsest partition, which is computable in O(|M | × |S|) by Kanellakis and
Smolka’s algorithm [16] and in O(|M | × log2(|S|)) by Paige and Tarjan’s algorithm
[22], where |M | is the number of transitions. In our case |M | = |S|2 × |AL|, and we
start from an initial partition corresponding to the equivalence relation ≈ deﬁned
by s ≈ t iﬀ obsL(s) = obsL(t). To verify LR we need to check every H transition,
which takes |S|2 × |AH |. The space requirement is comparable to the size of the
system itself in [22].
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Theorem 4.4 Given M ∈Mns, M in RESs is veriﬁable in O(|S|
2log2(|S|)×|AL|+
|S|2 × |AH |) time and space O(|M |).
If M is deterministic, the size of the transition relation |M | becomes |S|×|A| and
the time complexity of the bisimulation algorithm in [16] reduces to O(|S|2×|AL|).
Thus, the complexity for the whole procedure becomes O(|S|2 × |AL|+ |S| × |AH |)
time and and space linear in |M |. This is marginally better than than the result in
Proposition 4.2 on time and better on space. However, the reduction to a classical
model checking problem in Proposition 4.2 permits various optimization techniques
to be used (e.g., partial order reductions) so it is unclear which technique will
perform better in practice.
We note that another way to approach these results is by a reduction to results of
Bossi and Focardi et al. [4,10] who deﬁned a bisimulation based property P BNDC
on labelled transition systems (LTS) and proved a polynomial time complexity result
for it. We may deﬁne a linear time translation Fsl :Mns → L
IO from state-observed
system into τ -free and input-enabled LTS as follows. Assuming O = OH
.
∪ OL, for
M = 〈S, s0, step, obs, dom,A〉 ∈Mns, deﬁne Fsl(M) = 〈P, p0,→,L〉 where
(i) P = S, p0 = s0
(ii) L = A ∪O
(iii) →= {(s, a, t)|∃a ∈ A : t ∈ step(s, a)} ∪ {(s, o, s)|∃o ∈ O,u ∈ D : o = obsu(s)}.
The following relates RESs to a property on labelled transition systems.
Proposition 4.5 M ∈Mns in RESs iﬀ Fsl(M) is in P BNDC.
It follows that checking RESs has a polynomial time upper bound, from [10]. In
particular, [10]’s algorithm for P BNDC reduces a weak bisimulation problem into
checking strong bisimulation with an additional step of transitive closure on AH .
Their algorithm works in O(| → |× log2(|S|)) in general, where | → | is comparable
to |S|2 × |A| in our approach. The complexities of our direct approach and this
approach by reduction are therefore essentially equivalent.
4.2 Trace-Set Properties
Verifying the remaining properties NDIs, GNs and FCs proves to be more complex
than NIs and RESs. In this section we prove the following:
Theorem 4.6 For P any of NDIs, GNs or FCs, the problem of deciding M ∈ P
is PSPACE-complete.
For the lower bound part of this result, we use the following polynomial time
reduction to convert the classical problem of deciding if the language accepted by a
nondeterministic ﬁnite state automaton is equal to Σ∗ into the problem of verifying
any of the following: NDIs, GNs and FCs. Let A = 〈S,→,Σ, s0,F〉 be a nonde-
terministic ﬁnite state automaton (without -transitions) which does not accept ε,
where S is the set of states, Σ the alphabet, → the transition relation, s0 the initial
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state and F the set of ﬁnal states. Deﬁne M(A) = 〈Sm, s0, obs,next, dom,A
m〉 to
be the system with
• Sm = S
.
∪ SΣ, where SΣ = {s′0, s
′
1, s
′
2}
• Am = Σ
.
∪ {h} with dom(a) = L for all a ∈ Σ and dom(h) = H
• obs : D × Sm → {0, 1} with obsH(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S
m and obsL(s) = 0 for all
s ∈ S ∪ {s′0, s
′
2}, and obsL(s) = 1 if s = s
′
1
• next : Sm ×A → P(Sm) deﬁned as follows
· For a = h: next(s0, h) = {s
′
0}, next(s, h) = {s} if s 	= s0
· For a ∈ Σ: next(s′0, a) = S
Σ, next(s′1, a) = {s
′
1} and next(s
′
2, a) = {s
′
2}; for
s ∈ S, next(s, a) = {s′2} if there does not exist t such that s
a
−→ t; otherwise,
next(s, a) = {t ∈ S|s
a
−→ t} ∪ {s′1} if {t ∈ F|s
a
−→ t} 	= ∅, and next(s, a) =
{t ∈ S|s
a
−→ t} if {t ∈ F|s
a
−→ t} = ∅.
The construction of M(A) from A can be done in polynomial time.
Proposition 4.7 Let P be any of the properties NDIs, GNs, FCs. Then L(A) =
Σ∗\{ε} iﬀ M(A) ∈ P
Deciding if the language accepted by a nondeterministic ﬁnite state automaton
equals Σ∗\{ε} with |Σ| ≥ 2 is known to be a PSPACE-complete problem [11], so all
the above security properties are PSPACE hard. Next we will show each is solvable
in polynomial space.
Lemma 4.8 M ∈ Mns in NDIs iﬀ for every possible low observation β ∈
O+(AO+)∗, there exists a run r ∈ S(AS)∗ such that viewL(r) = β and ActH(r) = .
Lemma 4.9 If M ∈ Mns in NDIs then for every reachable state s and t ∈
next(s, a) with a ∈ AH , we have obsL(s) = obsL(t).
Lemma 4.8 shows a system is in NDIs iﬀ H’s actions do not cause more obser-
vations to L than if H does nothing. The following deﬁnitions sketch a reduction
from NDIs into a regular language equivalence problem.
Deﬁnition 4.10 The H-Condenser is the function CondH : Mns → Mns de-
ﬁned as follows on a machine M ∈ Mns. For s ∈ S let [s] = {t|∃α ∈ A
∗
H :
t is reachable from s by α}. Deﬁne CondH(M) = 〈Sc, s0,next
c, obsc, AL〉, where
• Sc = {[s] | s ∈ S}.
• nextc : Sc ×AL → P(S
c) such that [t] ∈ nextc([s], a) if there exists s′ ∈ [s], such
that t ∈ next(s′, a).
• obsc : Sc → P(O) such that obsc([s]) = {o ∈ O|∃s′ ∈ [s] : obsL(s
′) = o}.
Deﬁnition 4.11 The H-Restrictor is the function RestH :Mns → Mns such that
for M ∈ Mns, Rest
H(M) = 〈Sr, s0,next
r, obsL, AL〉, where S
r ⊆ S is the set of
states reachable from s0 by actions in AL only, and next
r : Sr × AL → S
r is the
restriction of the ‘next’ function to Sr ×AL.
The systems CondH(M) and RestH(M) can be regarded as Moore machines
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with the same input set AL and output set O. If all the values obs
c(s) are singletons
and we shift the outputs on states to their incoming transitions, we get two ﬁnite
automata on the same alphabet AL ×O.
Proposition 4.12 M ∈ NDIs iﬀ in Cond
H(M) for all s ∈ Sc, the set obsc(s) is
a singleton, and CondH(M) and RestH(M) are language equivalent on AL ×O.
Every state in CondH(M) having single observation is a necessary condition
by Lemma 4.9, and this is linearly checkable. The language equivalence between
the two regular language is a PSPACE-complete problem [11]. Both CondH(M)
and RestH(M) have state space at most S, so generating them can be done in
polynomial time. Thus, NDIs is in PSPACE.
This result is related to work of Focardi Gorrieri et al. [9], who studied
the complexity problem of the information ﬂow properties NNI, SNNI, NDC,
BNNI and SBNNI in a process algebraic framework. For input-enabled systems,
NNI, SNNI and NDC are equivalent.
Proposition 4.13 For M ∈Mns, we have M ∈ NDIs iﬀ Fsl(M) is in SNNI.
Focardi et al. give an exponential time subset-construction based algorithm for
the property SNNI. Our result for NDIs states the complexity more precisely, but
also yields exponential time in practice, pending advances in complexity theory.
The security property GNs requires arbitrary H action interleavings to be con-
sistent with L views, and it is seemingly more complicated than NDIs. However,
the following analysis yields an in-place exhaustive solution to refute GNs.
Deﬁne V iewL : A
∗ → P(O+(AO+)∗) such that an observation β ∈ V iewL(α) if
there exists a run r with viewL(r) = β and Act(r) = α. Intuitively V iewL(α) is the
set of L observations compatible with α.
Lemma 4.14 M ∈Mns is in GNs iﬀ for all α ∈ A
∗, V iewL(α) = V iewL(α|L).
Proof. For the ‘only if’ part, suppose M ∈ GNs. We need to show V iewL(α) =
V iewL(α|L). For a particular β ∈ V iewL(α), there exists a run r with Act(r) = α
and viewL(r) = β. From M ∈ GNs we can delete actions in AH from r to get a
new run r′ such that viewL(r
′) = β. If all actions in AH are deleted, Act(r) = α|L,
so β ∈ V iewL(α|L). So V iewL(α) ⊆ V iewL(α|L). V iewL(α|L) ⊆ V iewL(α) can
be proved similarly by inserting actions in AH into a run compatible with L’s
observation in V iewL(α|L). For the ‘if’ part, suppose V iewL(α) = V iewL(α|L)
for all α ∈ A∗. It follows that V iewL(α
′) = V iewL(α) for any α,α
′ ∈ A∗ with
α′|L = α|L. For a particular run r with Act(r) = α, an arbitrary insertion or
deletion of actions in AH into α generates a new action sequence α
′ with α′|L = α|L.
From V iewL(α
′) = V iewL(α), we have viewL(r) ∈ V iewL(α
′), so that there exists
a run r′ with Act(r′) = α′ and viewL(r
′) = viewL(r). So M in GNs. 
From Lemma 4.14, we have M 	∈ GNs iﬀ there exists some action sequence α ∈
A∗ and some L observation β ∈ O+(AO+)∗, such that β ∈ V iewL(α) \ V iewL(α|L)
or β ∈ V iewL(α|L) \ V iewL(α). This motivates the following algorithm DecGN ,
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which, given a system M , nondeterministically guesses an action sequence α and a
low observation β and checks consistency with α and α|L.
DecGN(M):
(i) Place a red marker and a blue marker on the initial state.
(ii) Repeat the next step 22×|S| times, where |S| is the number of states in M .
(iii) Nondeterministically select a ∈ A,
• If a ∈ AH , then for every s with a blue marker, erase the old marker on s and
place new blue markers on all t ∈ next(s, a). If there exists any states s, t
marked either red or blue with obsL(s) 	= obsL(t) return true, else proceed.
• If a ∈ AL, then nondeterministically choose o ∈ O. For every s with a
red marker, erase the old red marker on s and place new red markers on
every t ∈ next(s, a) with obsL(t) = o. Then do the same on blue markers.
After that, if there is only one colour remaining, return true, if no colour
remaining, return false, otherwise, proceed.
(iv) Return false in the end.
Intuitively, the blue markers are tracing the executions of a possible input action
sequence α with respect to a particular L view, the red markers are tracing the
executions of α restricted to L with respect to the same L view. Whenever any H
action changes L’s local view or only one of the sets of executions can follow a step
in the L view, GNs is detected to be false. The number 2
2×|S| covers all possible
pairs of sets of marked states. Formally, we claim the following.
Proposition 4.15 M 	∈ GNs iﬀ there exists a computation of DecGN(M) which
returns true.
Since the algorithm is nondeterministic, M 	∈ GNs is decidable in NPSPACE.
Savitch’s theorem states PSPACE = NPSPACE, so deciding GNs is in PSPACE.
FCs can be shown in NPSPACE in a similar procedure as DecGN by ﬁxing not
only L’s observations, but also H’s observations.
5 Heuristics
We now consider some heuristic approaches which may optimize the veriﬁcation of
the properties we have considered, which work by reducing the problem of verifying
a property on a system to a veriﬁcation on an “equivalent” system.
In particular, we deﬁne a relation capturing equivalence on states with respect
to L’s actions, and consider the use of this to compress the state space of the system.
Deﬁne an L-bisimulation on a system M to be an equivalence relation ∼L⊆ S × S
such that s1 ∼L s2 iﬀ
(i) obsL(s1) = obsL(s2)
(ii) for all a ∈ A and s′1 ∈ next(s1, a) there exists s
′
2 ∈ next(s2, a) such that
s′1 ∼L s
′
2.
Write [s] for the equivalence class of s with respect to ∼L.
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Let min be a function Mns → Mns such that min(M) = 〈S
m, sm0 ,
nextm, obsm, dom,A〉, where, with ∼L the maximal L-bisimulation on M ,
(i) Sm = S/ ∼L and s
m
0 = [s0]
(ii) For [s], [t] ∈ Sm, a ∈ A, [t] ∈ next([s], a) if there exists s′ ∈ [s] and t′ ∈ [t] such
that t′ ∈ next(s′, a)
(iii) For [s] ∈ Sm, obsmL ([s]) = o if obsL(s) = o, and obs
m
H([s]) = ⊥ for all [s] ∈ S
m,
where ⊥ is any observation on the range of obs.
Theorem 5.1 For M ∈ Mns, M ∈ P iﬀ min(M) ∈ P, where P is any of the
properties NDIs, GNs, FCs and RESs. In particular, M ∈ RESs iﬀ for all s ∈
Smin(M), a ∈ AH , next(s, a) = {s}.
This result may produce optimizations since the size of min(M) may be sig-
niﬁcantly smaller than M . In general, ‘bisimulation minimization’ is not a vi-
able approach for the veriﬁcation of invariance properties since the partition based
bisimulation usually takes more resources than it saves in the subsequent model
checking [7]. However, for properties such as NDIs, GNs and FCs, which seem to
unavoidably take exponential time, spending polynomial time on minimization may
beneﬁt the veriﬁcation signiﬁcantly. Also, on deterministic systems, as described in
Proposition 4.1, we reduce the NIs problem into a safety problem which is veriﬁable
by running a model checker on a larger state space (precisely, from |S| to |S|2). This
extra cost may mean that a prior minimization step is beneﬁcial.
In this case, another consideration may result in further reductions. In state
based systems, a state is usually represented as an assignment to a set of variables.
Let s ∈ S be represented as a function s : V → U where V is a set of variables and
U is a universe of values. Let the L observation function be represented so that
obsL(s) is the restriction of s to a set VL ⊆ V . For v ∈ VL, deﬁne the function
obsvL(s) = s(v), and let M
v be the system in which obsL is replaced by obs
v
L. Then
we have the following:
Proposition 5.2 For M ∈Ms, we have M ∈ NIs iﬀ M
v ∈ NIs for all v ∈ VL.
This result suggests an approach where we apply the bisimulation minimization
approach to each Mv before applying the doubling construction. Each of these
systems may be signiﬁcantly smaller than min(M). Approximately, the bisimu-
lation algorithm takes O(|AL| × |S|log2(|S|)) to get a partition and the further
exhaustive search from Theorem 4.2 takes O(|Sr|
2 × |A|) where Sr is the maximal
size quotient state space obtained for the Mv. So the whole time complexity is
|VL|×O(|AL|× |S|log2(|S|)+ |Sr|
2×|A|). Since |S| ≈ 2|V | if all variables are binary,
|VL| is far less than |S|. Since observations in M
v are based on a single variable,
it seems likely that |Sr| is far less than |S|, and |Sr|
2 × |A| may be far less than
|S|2 × |A|. Also |AL| × |S|log2(|S|) is far less than |S|
2 × |A|. So we conclude it is
very likely that |VL| × (|AL| × |S|log2(|S|) + |Sr|
2 × |A|) is far less than |S|2 × |A|.
For the space complexity, we are using additional space O(|Sr|
2) repeatedly in the
model checking phase instead of O(|S|2). Since space costs are often the critical
factor in model checking, this gain may be signiﬁcant.
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6 Conclusion
We have considered a number of security properties on state-observed systems and
have studied the complexity of the veriﬁcation problems for all these properties.
The unwinding characterizable properties NIs and RESs are tractable, based on
the result of deciding bisimulation on ﬁnite states. Both symbolic and explicit state
methods are applicable to these properties. The trace based properties (NDIs,
GNs, FCs) are PSPACE-complete. Furthermore, we have proposed some heuristics
based on bisimulation minimization and argued that they may be eﬀective. We
leave the work of implementation and empirical evaluation of this claim for future
work. It will be interesting, in particular, to compare the performance of BDD
and explicit state model checking approaches with the compositional approaches to
noninterference veriﬁcation of [9], which are based on process algebraic modelling.
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